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This article presents a new series of monthly equity returns for the British  
stock market for the period 1825–1870. In addition to calculating capital 
appreciation and dividend yields, the article also estimates the effect of 
survivorship bias on returns. Three notable findings emerge from this study. 
First, stock market returns in the 1825–1870 period are broadly similar for 
Britain and the United States, although the British market is less risky. Second, 
real returns in the 1825–1870 period are higher than in subsequent epochs  
of British history. Third, unlike the modern era, dividends are the most 
important component of returns.  
 
n this article, we present newly developed monthly indices of returns 
for the British stock market for the period 1825 to 1870. Such 
historical series of returns are of interest to economic historians for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, indices of returns can frequently serve as a 
measure of the levels and fluctuations of real economic activity, which 
may be particularly important in historical periods when real economic 
data is lacking. Secondly, series of returns can be used to assess the 
effects on an economy of major political, legal, or technological 
changes. Financial economists are also becoming increasingly interested 
in the historical returns of financial assets.1 This interest partially stems 
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from a desire to calculate the expected equity risk premium, which 
requires long time series of historical returns to reduce the estimation 
error.2 In particular, academics and practitioners are interested in 
discovering whether or not the high returns on stock markets over the 
past half-century are an aberration or are somehow intrinsic to equity as 
an asset.  
Long-run series of stock market returns are available for the majority 
of industrialized nations, but mainly focus on the second half of the 
twentieth century.3 However, to date, monthly returns data stretching 
back into the nineteenth century has only been developed for the United 
States.4 This article pushes the development of such series further back 
into the past by constructing monthly returns for stocks traded on the 
London market for the period 1825 to 1870.  
During the period of our study, Britain underwent major social, legal, 
and technological changes, which affected the demand for and supply of 
equity capital. This makes the development of our series of returns all 
the more pertinent and interesting. On the demand-side, the increasingly 
prosperous middle classes were seeking an alternative to consols for 
their savings.5 On the supply-side, Parliament increasingly bypassed  
the conservative common law by liberalizing incorporation law from 
1825 onwards. In addition, the development of the steam locomotive 
resulted in a capital-intensive industry requiring large amounts of equity 
investment.   
 The existing stock market indices for pre-1870 Britain are (a) the 
monthly index of Arthur D. Gayer, Anna Jacobson, and Isaiah Finkelstein 
covering 1811 to 1850; (b) F. A. Hayek’s unpublished monthly index 
which covers 1820–1868; and (c) Paul Rousseaux’s annual index for 
1825–1867, which, following the criticism of Gayer et al., is infrequently 
used.6 From the perspective of the financial economist, these series are 
defective because they leave out dividends and are simply indices of 
price appreciation. Consequently, in this article, we develop a series of 
monthly returns, comprising both capital appreciation and dividends for 
Britain for the period 1825 to 1870. 
 
 
 
2 Goetzmann and Ibbotson, Equity Risk Premium. 
3 Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, Triumph of the Optimists. 
4 Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Peng, “New Historical Database.” Grossman, “New Indices,” has 
constructed annual indices of total returns for the British stock market for the period 1870 to 
1914. 
5 Gayer, Rostow, and Jacobson Schwartz, Growth and Fluctuation, vol. I, pp. 377, 380, 410. 
6 Gayer, Jacobson, and Finkelstein, “British Share Prices”; and Gayer, Rostow, and Jacobson 
Schwartz, Growth and Fluctuation. Hayek’s and Rousseaux’s indices are reproduced in Gayer, 
Rostow, and Jacobson Schwartz, Growth and Fluctuation. 
 Rule Britannia!  1109 
  
 
 Gayer et al.’s and Hayek’s indices can also be criticized because  
they are small samples rather than including all available stock  
price data. In addition, Hayek’s index excludes banks and insurance 
companies. In contrast, our indices cover the vast majority of stocks 
traded on the London market.  
 The three existing indices mainly include stocks which survived  
and were frequently quoted for the entire period, thus causing a sample 
selection bias. We avoid such a bias by collecting all available stock-
price data reported in this period. Furthermore, our estimates are 
adjusted for survivorship bias.  
 A further defect of existing indices is that they are either unweighted 
in the case of Hayek’s or weighted by the number of shares outstanding 
in the case of the Gayer et al. index. The Gayer et al. index also 
assigned weights to each industry subcategory based on paid-up capital, 
but these weights only change five times throughout their sample 
period. In contrast, we produce unweighted indices as well as indices 
weighted by paid-up capital and market capitalization, with weights 
changing on a monthly basis.  
 When we compare the returns generated in the 1825–1870 British 
equity market with those produced in later periods in Britain, we find 
that our sample period was an apparent golden era for investors as they 
received higher returns yet faced lower risk than in the twentieth 
century. We also find that in the second half of the twentieth century, 
dividends constitute a substantially smaller proportion of total returns 
than they did in the nineteenth century.  
 This article proceeds as follows. The second section outlines the  
data sources used and our sampling methodology. The third section 
describes how our portfolios and indices are constructed. The fourth 
section analyzes the size of our sample and its main constituents; it also 
presents estimates of total market capitalization. The fifth section 
examines our monthly indices of market capitalization. The sixth section 
analyzes dividend yields and total returns in our sample period. In the 
seventh section, we adjust our series of returns for survivorship bias. The 
penultimate section provides a comparative perspective on our estimates 
of returns.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 The main data source for this project is the Course of the Exchange, 
which from the beginning of the nineteenth century was regarded as the 
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official price list for the London Stock Exchange.7 Up until 1843 it was 
published in London twice weekly, and from then on it was published 
daily. We obtained a duplicate of the British Library’s microfilm copy 
of this publication, which covers the period from March 1825 onwards. 
The Course of the Exchange reports the following for each stock: the 
number of issued shares, the nominal and paid-up (or par) value of 
shares, the dividend paid by the stock, and a share price if trade had 
taken place in the company’s stock. 
 Our sample period begins in 1825 because this marks the beginning 
of the liberalization of incorporation law in Britain. Furthermore, prior 
to this period the performance of joint-stock companies was closely tied 
to that of the government, because such companies were often part of 
the government’s politico-economic apparatus, e.g., Bank of England 
and East India Company.8 For this reason, these two companies are 
excluded from our sample.9  
 We manually collected the last share price of the month for all 
common equity stocks reported in the Course of the Exchange, working 
our way methodically through each month.10 The small number of 
colonial and foreign railways listed in the Course of the Exchange is 
excluded because it is difficult to tell whether securities are debt, 
common equity, or preference shares. Thankfully, The Railway Times 
enabled us to verify the nature of British railway securities. In our 
sample period, there were 1,119 different companies and 1,657 different 
common equity securities listed in the Course of the Exchange.  
 Unlike previous indices, ours includes all stocks reported in the 
Course of the Exchange with several exceptions. First, stocks which 
were listed for less than 12 months were excluded since it is doubtful 
whether these companies really got off the ground. As can be observed 
from Table 1, nearly half of those companies excluded on this criterion 
were railways. Second, 100 companies were excluded because no 
capitalization data (i.e., number of issued shares, nominal or paid-up 
value) was reported for the stock in the Course of the Exchange.11  
  
 
7 Harris, Industrializing English Law, p. 120. 
8 Gayer, Rostow, and Jacobson Schwartz, Growth and Fluctuation, vol. I, p. 410. 
9 The Course of the Exchange viewed these securities in this way as it reported the stock 
prices of these companies in a separate section along with the price of government debt 
instruments. 
10 Each stock price series was analyzed individually so as to pick up data-inputting errors or 
printing mistakes in the Course of the Exchange. If a share price was substantially out of line 
with prices either side of it, the Course of the Exchange was double-checked, and in the event 
that it wasn’t a data-inputting error, it was deleted and the previous reported price was used as 
the current month’s price. This, however, was extremely uncommon. 
11 The Railway Times was used to help fill in missing capitalization data for British railways. 
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TABLE 1 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMPANIES AND SECURITIES INCLUDED IN AND 
EXCLUDED FROM OUR INDICES 
Industry 
 
No. 
Companies 
Included in 
Index 
 
No. 
Securities 
Included 
in Index
Duration of  
Security Listing  
(months) 
Percentage of 
Months When Stock 
Price is Reported 
No. 
Securities 
Excluded 
Due to 
Being 
Listed for 
 12 
Months 
 
No. 
Securities 
Excluded 
Due to 
Insufficient 
Data1 
     Mean Median Mean Median    
Railways 180 329 86.9 56.5 74.3 85.3 160 67 
Miscellaneous 132 142 99.7 55.0 56.6 58.6 90 87 
Banks 111 138 100.2 57.0 72.1 82.4 52 11 
British mines 75 75 98.5 79.5 51.5 51.5 17 11 
Insurance 72 79 233.3 171.0 63.8 67.5 6 25 
Canals 63 65 294.9 267.0 75.1 76.3 1 6 
Foreign mines 58 59 87.6 45.0 68.2 75.4 18 14 
Gas, light, and coke 48 69 176.9 126.0 58.8 62.5 14 32 
Docks 15 16 229.1 160.0 73.6 69.8 3 8 
Telegraph 14 15 54.8 38.0 77.7 95.7 4 2 
Waterworks 14 18 250.9 211.0 74.1 79.3 1 9 
Bridges 5 5 351.2 452.0 71.1 72.0 1 1 
Roads 4 5 126.4 132.0 50.8 41.7 0 2 
         
Overall sample 681 1,015 127.9 77.0 67.6 73.8 367 275 
1 If less than 10 percent of months had prices reported, the security was excluded.  Companies 
with no capitalization data were also excluded. 
Source: See the text. 
 
Third, stocks were excluded if prices were reported for less than 10 
percent of their listing duration. This condition excludes infrequently 
traded stocks, which were typically issued by very small companies. 
Using this criterion, we excluded 175 stocks.12 As can be seen from 
Table 1, after applying all the above criteria, we had data on 1,015 
securities for 681 companies.   
 The relative illiquidity of the nineteenth-century stock market meant 
that in some months no trades took place, and hence no stock prices 
were reported in the Course of the Exchange. As can be seen from 
Table 1, on average, stock prices were reported for 67.6 percent of the 
months for which a stock was listed. If there was no stock price reported 
in a particular month or for several months and the stock was still listed, 
we assumed that the last reported price was the current stock price  
for the month, and if no stock price was reported for 48 consecutive  
 
12 Notably, using an even less stringent criterion (i.e., 5 percent), would still result in the vast 
majority of these firms being excluded from our indices. 
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months or more, we assumed that the company didn’t exist for this 
period. In order to check for the robustness of this methodology,  
we also calculated returns whenever having no share price reported  
meant that that particular stock was omitted from our calculations.  
This approach has virtually no effect on our average return estimates, 
although, unsurprisingly, the standard deviation is slightly higher.   
The Course of the Exchange reported annual or semiannual dividends 
in each issue as a percentage of paid-up capital or as dividend per share.13 
Dividends were assumed to be zero when no dividend was reported. For 
each stock, we calculated the annual dividend per share, which was then 
spread out evenly over the 12 months. The monthly dividend yield for 
each stock was obtained by dividing this figure by the previous month’s 
share price.  
 
INDEX CONSTRUCTION 
 
 Our indices are calculated using returns data, which is how other 
historical stock market indices have been created.14 As is well known, 
the total return of a stock consists of capital appreciation and dividend 
yield. The capital appreciation for stock i at month t is calculated as:  
 
, , 1
,
, 1
i t i t
i t
i t
p p
A
p


  
 
where pi,t is the stock price of security i in month t. The dividend yield 
for stock i at month t is calculated as: 
 
,
,
, 1
i t
i t
i t
d
DY
p 
  
 
where di,t is the dividend per share paid on security i in month t. 
Consequently, the total return on security i in month t is: 
 
, , ,i t i t i tR A DY   
  
 
13 We cross-referenced the dividend rates reported in the Course of the Exchange with 
dividends declared at company annual meetings (which were reported in The Times) in order to 
verify that the dividend rates in the Course of the Exchange were reported as a percentage of 
paid-up capital.  
14 Schwert, “Indexes of U.S. Stock Prices”; Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Peng, “New Historical 
Database”; and Grossman, “New Indices.” 
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 The capital appreciation of the overall market in month t is a 
weighted average of each stock’s capital appreciation: 
 
, ,
1
N
t i t i t
i
MA w A
 
 ¦  
 
where wi,t is a weighting factor. Similarly, the dividend yield of the 
overall market in month t is a weighted average of each stock’s 
dividend yield: 
 
, ,
1
N
t i t i t
i
MDY w DY
 
 ¦  
 
Consequently, the total return of the overall market in month t is:  
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1
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N
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 ¦  
 
 We use three different weighting factors when constructing our 
indices. Firstly, we use market capitalization as a weighting factor, 
where 
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Secondly, we use a paid-up capital as a weighting factor, where
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Thirdly, we use an equally weighted (or unweighted) method: 
 
,
1
i t
t
w
N
  
 
where Nt is the number of securities existing on the market at time t; qi,t
is the number of issued shares for stock i; and vi,t is the paid-up capital 
for stock i at time t.  
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 The advantage of the unweighted returns is they won’t be overly 
affected by large price movements of large firms. On the other hand, the 
unweighted returns give equal weight to large economically important 
stocks and relatively small unimportant stocks. A more fundamental 
problem is that when stocks are illiquid and trade infrequently, this can 
introduce a significant bias into equally weighted long-term returns. As 
some stocks in our sample were traded infrequently, we also weight  
our returns using paid-up capital and market capitalization in order to 
overcome this potential upward bias. The weights on the paid-up capital 
returns will possibly be quite dated, as paid-up capital doesn’t change 
often. However, weighting returns by market capitalization overcomes 
this deficiency. 
 In order to take account of the effect of changes in paid-up capital, 
nominal value (i.e., stock splits), or number of issued shares on stock 
returns, we eliminate stocks which have such changes from our capital 
appreciation calculations for the month in which the capitalization change 
occurs, as it is difficult to determine the actual capital appreciation in 
such circumstances.15 
 Annual calendar total returns for the overall market are calculated  
by compounding monthly returns. Annual calendar capital appreciation 
is also calculated by compounding monthly returns. Annual dividend  
yield for the overall market is then calculated by subtracting the annual 
capital appreciation from annual total return.  
 Our capital appreciation and total return data are converted into 
indices, with March 1825 being the base month, at which date the 
indices (It) are set to 100. At month t, the index number for each of the 
returns series (MAi, MRi) equals: 
 
1
1
(1 ) 100
(1 ) 100
T
MA
t i
i
T
MR
t i
i
I MA
I MR
 
 
  u
  u


 
 
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 In the years 1824/25, 127 companies were formed and still in 
business at the end of 1825, a further 118 were established and  
 
 
15 Grossman, “New Indices,” p. 125. 
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FIGURE 1 
NUMBER OF COMPANIES AND EQUITY SECURITIES IN INDICES AND LISTED IN 
COURSE OF EXCHANGE AT END OF YEAR, 1825–1870 
 
Notes: The number of securities exceeds the number of companies because firms sometimes had 
“old” and “new” stock trading simultaneously or firms issued several types of common equity, 
usually having different paid-up values.  For example, from 1837 the National Provincial Bank 
had two types of common stock: one type had a £100 paid-up value, while the second type had a 
£20 paid-up value. 
 
subsequently abandoned during the period, and a further 143 companies 
were projected.16 Although this growth in joint-stock companies may be 
partially due to the repeal of the Bubble Act and the eradication of 
corporate monopolies in banking and marine insurance,17 it may also 
reflect the improved economic conditions due to the Pax Britannica 
which had emerged following the nation’s victory in the Napoleonic 
wars.  
 From Figure 1, we can see that the number of companies listed on the 
Course of the Exchange at the end of 1825 was 236. As can be seen 
from Figure 1, our sample excludes many of the short-lived “bubble” 
companies in existence in this period. 
 The sharp increase in the number of companies in our sample 
between 1834 and 1836 is predominantly due to the establishment of 
banks and railways. The increase in the number of railway companies 
was a result of a boom in railway promotion, whereas the growth in 
number of joint-stock banks can be largely attributed to the passage of  
 
16 English, Complete View. 
17 Harris, Industrializing English Law, p. 218. 
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legislation in 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV, c.98), which permitted non-issuing 
joint-stock banks to establish in London. The subsequent fall in the 
number of companies listed and in our index can mainly be explained 
by the disappearance of companies which had established in the mania 
of 1836 as well as the demise of ten canal companies. 
 The famous railway mania of 1844/45 is almost solely responsible  
for the increase and subsequent fall in the number of securities and 
companies included in our indices in the mid-1840s. Notably, as can be 
seen from Figure 1, there were many “bubble” railway companies and 
securities listed in the Course of the Exchange.  
 Notably, the freedom to incorporate, which was granted in 1844,  
and the freedom to incorporate with limited liability, which was granted  
in 1855, does not appear to have affected the number of companies 
issuing publicly quoted equity.18 It is only after the passage of the  
1862 Companies Act that there is a steep increase in the number of 
companies listed in the Course of the Exchange and in our sample.19 
The financial crisis triggered by the Overend Gurney collapse in  
May 1866 resulted in the failure of many of these newly established 
companies, which explains the post-1865 fall in the number of 
companies listed and in our sample. 
 From Figure 2, which contains the paid-up capital and market 
capitalization of our sample of stocks, we can see that for the decade  
up until 1834, the value of stocks changed little, which is unsurprising 
given that the number of companies in our sample doesn’t change  
much in this period. From c.1834 until 1845 nominal total market 
capitalization and market capitalization as a proportion of GDP increases 
substantially. As can be seen from Figure 2, this is mostly attributable to 
the advent of the railways. Notably, it is during the railway mania of the 
mid-1840s that total paid-up capital and total market capitalization 
deviate substantially for the first time. The collapse of the railway mania 
in late 1845 is particularly apparent in the fall in market capitalization as 
a proportion of GDP. The subsequent calls on railway shareholders to pay 
up uncalled capital results in an increase in paid-up capital, accompanied 
by a few years of volatility in the total value of the market.  
 As can be seen from Figure 2, market capitalization rises quickly 
from the end of 1851 until July 1853, thereafter it falls markedly over 
the next ten months. This is more than likely due to the monetary shock 
arising from the increase in Bank Rate from 3.0 to 5.5 percent over this 
 
18 The Acts referred to are Joint-Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act (1844), 7 
& 8 Vict., c. 110, and An Act for Limiting the Liability of Members of Certain Joint-Stock 
Companies (1855), 18/19 Vict., c. 113. 
19 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89. 
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FIGURE 2 
MONTHLY MARKET CAPITALIZATION, 1825–1870 
 
Notes: Market Capitalization/GDP is on the right-hand scale. Market Capitalization, Total Paid-
Up Capital, and Market Capitalization Without Railways are on the left-hand scale. 
Sources: See the text.
 
time period, which was a reaction to harvest failures and the growing 
threat of war in the Near East.20 Indeed, it was only towards the end of 
the Crimean War that total market capitalization begins to rise again, 
and it follows an upwards trend (nominally and relative to GDP) until 
the Overend Gurney collapse in May 1866. A large proportion of the 
increase in market value, particularly from 1862 onwards, was due to 
new non-railway companies entering the market. 
 As can be clearly seen from Table 2, great changes occurred in  
the sectoral composition of the equity market in our sample period.  
For example, the canal sector dominates our sample in terms of market 
capitalization and number of issues at the beginning of our sample 
period, but by the end it has effectively disappeared. On the other  
hand, from the mid-1830s onwards, railways increasingly dominate our 
sample in terms of market capitalization and even issues for a time. By 
the time our sample reaches the 1860s, railways and banks are by far  
the two largest sectors in terms of market capitalization. In terms of 
percentage of issues, banks have close to one-fifth of the market in the 
1860s, closely followed by the railways.  
 
20 Clapham, Bank of England, vol. II, p. 218. 
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TABLE 2 
BREAKDOWN OF THE SECTORS CONTAINED IN THE STOCK MARKET INDICES 
(percentage of issue and market capitalization [mc]) 
 Banks Insurance Canals Railways Mining Other 
 Issues MC Issues MC Issues MC Issues MC Issues MC Issues MC 
1825 1.24 0.35 12.42 17.36 29.19 50.65 1.24 0.34 12.42 2.43 43.48 28.88 
1826 1.86 1.16 16.15 19.45 32.30 48.27 0.62 0.29 9.32 2.95 39.75 27.87 
1827 1.19 1.59 17.26 19.23 35.71 43.99 1.79 1.01 6.55 3.14 37.50 31.04 
1828 1.18 1.42 15.98 19.46 37.28 43.92 1.78 1.69 5.92 1.60 37.87 31.94 
1829 1.22 1.49 16.46 20.28 37.20 43.05 1.83 2.45 5.49 1.58 37.80 31.15 
1830 1.23 1.88 17.28 19.99 37.04 40.89 1.85 3.37 5.56 1.61 37.04 32.26 
1831 1.25 1.91 16.88 19.81 37.50 41.65 1.88 3.94 4.38 1.70 38.13 31.00 
1832 0.62 1.55 16.67 20.18 37.04 41.19 2.47 3.64 4.32 1.96 38.89 31.48 
1833 1.19 1.99 16.07 20.36 35.12 38.80 4.76 5.65 4.76 3.85 38.10 29.36 
1834 2.29 3.75 15.43 20.31 33.71 37.94 5.71 6.76 5.71 3.12 37.14 28.12 
1835 6.57 10.37 14.55 17.82 28.64 31.17 9.86 12.52 7.51 3.31 32.86 24.81 
1836 8.58 14.11 13.30 16.05 25.32 27.13 15.02 16.78 7.73 3.42 30.04 22.51 
1837 10.27 15.03 14.29 15.82 25.89 27.58 12.50 17.77 5.80 2.90 31.25 20.91 
1838 11.40 15.07 15.35 14.16 25.00 23.40 14.47 23.25 5.70 3.69 28.07 20.44 
1839 10.45 12.44 15.45 13.98 25.45 23.11 15.00 26.07 5.91 2.95 27.73 21.45 
1840 10.45 12.48 17.27 12.65 24.09 19.01 16.36 34.23 5.45 2.83 26.36 18.81 
1841 10.31 11.99 15.25 12.06 24.22 18.24 19.28 36.77 4.93 1.18 26.01 19.77 
1842 9.48 10.39 15.64 11.57 23.70 16.58 19.91 39.23 4.74 1.12 26.54 21.11 
1843 8.87 8.84 14.78 10.23 24.14 14.58 21.67 44.17 3.94 0.82 26.60 21.35 
1844 7.66 7.60 13.88 8.97 22.49 11.99 30.14 51.92 3.35 0.92 22.49 18.60 
1845 7.02 6.53 12.28 8.06 14.91 8.17 44.30 59.78 3.51 1.51 17.98 15.96 
1846 7.48 6.59 13.55 8.00 12.62 6.14 45.79 63.16 3.27 1.18 17.29 14.93 
1847 6.56 5.52 11.07 6.81 11.48 5.32 51.23 68.39 3.69 0.98 15.98 12.98 
1848 6.15 5.15 10.77 6.65 10.77 5.01 55.00 71.07 3.08 0.74 14.23 11.39 
1849 6.64 6.64 12.45 8.84 11.62 6.14 49.79 63.08 3.32 1.04 16.18 14.26 
1850 8.02 6.76 16.04 8.94 12.74 5.46 41.04 64.44 4.25 0.99 17.92 13.41 
1851 8.10 7.86 16.67 9.43 12.38 5.09 36.67 61.21 5.24 1.32 20.95 15.09 
1852 9.38 8.61 16.07 8.16 11.61 4.20 31.70 61.36 10.27 3.28 20.98 14.38 
1853 9.13 11.21 15.08 8.86 9.92 4.42 29.37 57.45 12.70 2.38 23.81 15.68 
1854 9.62 11.63 15.90 8.19 10.46 4.16 27.62 58.34 11.72 1.63 24.69 16.05 
1855 11.56 13.57 15.56 8.26 9.33 3.89 26.67 55.25 10.22 1.58 26.67 17.46 
1856 12.78 12.95 13.66 7.67 9.25 3.47 26.43 57.52 7.93 1.28 29.96 17.12 
1857 11.84 11.95 12.65 8.63 6.12 3.18 24.08 57.72 16.73 1.96 28.57 16.56 
1858 12.39 12.23 12.39 8.53 4.70 2.63 24.79 58.64 16.67 1.76 29.06 16.20 
1859 11.97 13.33 13.25 8.65 2.99 2.45 22.22 58.69 20.94 1.93 28.63 14.95 
1860 12.50 13.36 14.22 8.70 2.16 1.82 21.12 60.29 20.26 1.92 29.74 13.91 
1861 12.13 13.89 15.06 8.77 2.09 1.80 22.18 59.05 19.67 2.15 28.87 14.35 
1862 15.14 15.44 14.34 8.62 1.59 1.68 22.31 57.46 18.73 2.29 27.89 14.51 
1863 21.15 18.98 14.34 8.39 1.43 1.53 19.00 53.18 15.05 1.90 29.03 16.02 
1864 23.15 20.69 13.18 7.44 1.29 1.29 16.08 52.06 14.15 1.76 32.15 16.77 
1865 22.19 21.07 11.25 6.78 1.25 1.25 15.63 50.71 14.06 1.77 35.63 18.42 
1866 21.18 18.01 11.81 6.57 1.39 1.33 15.63 54.54 12.50 1.25 37.50 18.29 
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TABLE 2 — continued 
 Banks Insurance Canals Railways Mining Other 
 Issues MC Issues MC Issues MC Issues MC Issues MC Issues MC 
1867 21.01 18.38 12.32 7.50 1.09 0.61 14.86 53.56 13.04 1.47 37.68 18.48 
1868 21.25 18.78 11.72 7.11 1.10 0.58 15.38 52.64 12.09 1.18 38.46 19.71 
1869 21.53 18.12 11.68 6.79 0.73 0.48 15.33 51.31 11.68 1.05 39.05 22.26 
1870 23.32 17.73 12.65 6.93 0.79 0.44 13.04 54.48 11.86 1.04 38.34 19.38 
Notes: The “Other” category includes companies from the following sectors: water utilities; 
roads; bridges; docks; telegraph companies; gas, light and coke companies; shipping; food 
production; industrial; brewing; manufacturing; investment, financial and mortgage; and land. 
Source: See the text. 
 
 As the Course of the Exchange only covers companies traded on the 
London market, a question arises as to how representative our sample  
is of the overall British equity market. Richard Grossman’s indices for 
the British equity market begin in 1870, and his sample covers the 
majority of equities issued in Britain’s various stock exchanges.21 His 
sample in 1870 includes 520 equities, with an approximate market 
capitalization of £750m. In contrast, our sample, which is based on 
those firms listed on the London stock exchange, has 240 securities  
with an approximate market capitalization of £285m. The difference  
in market capitalization is largely explained by the absence of foreign 
railways from our sample; whereas the difference in issues can be 
largely attributed to foreign railway stock and joint-stock banks which 
were traded on the various regional stock exchanges.22 Consequently, 
apart from some Irish, Scottish, and English provincial banks, our 
sample provides a reasonably good coverage of equity issued by British 
companies.     
 
INDICES OF CAPITAL APPRECIATION 
 
 Figure 3 contains our monthly capital appreciation indices. The index 
weighted by market capitalization outperforms our other indices until 
early 1867, when the unweighted index surpasses it. This suggests that 
large companies performed better in terms of capital appreciation than 
small companies for most of the sample period. However, after early 
1867 small firms appear to perform relatively better than large firms, 
possibly because the risk premia for small firms had increased after the 
financial crisis stemming from the Overend Gurney crash demonstrated 
the fragility of small newly formed companies. 
 
21 Grossman, “New Indices.” 
22 See Killick and Thomas, “Provincial Stock Exchanges.” 
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FIGURE 3 
MONTHLY INDICES OF CAPITAL APPRECIATION, 1825–1870 
 
Notes: The Gayer et al. index and the Hayek index are on the right-hand scale.  Our indices are 
on the left-hand scale. 
Sources: See the text and Gayer, Rostow, and Jacobson Schwartz, Growth and Fluctuation, pp. 
368–69, 456–57. 
 
 The index weighted by paid-up capital performs the least well of the 
three indices, particularly after the late 1840s. This suggests that 
companies with larger paid-up capital performed less well than their 
peers. This is not surprising given that, as can be seen in Figure 2,  
the paid-up capital of the market exceeded total market capitalization  
from early 1848 until 1862. A fraction of railway companies which 
established during the mania had high paid-up capital, but in the crash 
their share prices fell below their par value and remained there for a 
long period of time. 
 As can be seen from Figure 3, the Gayer et al. and Hayek indices differ 
from our new indices, which is unsurprising given the small samples they 
used, the method of constructing the indices, and the absence of value 
weighting. Indeed, our new indices are negatively correlated with that  
of Gayer et al., and positively correlated with Hayek’s.23 This raises the 
 
23 The coefficient of correlation between our weighted by market capitalization index and the 
Gayer et al index is –0.284, and the coefficient of correlation between our index and Hayek’s is 
0.674.  
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interesting question of whether the indices of Gayer et al. and Hayek 
allowed them to correctly identify cyclical fluctuations in this period.  
As we shall see below, Gayer et al.’s hypothesis that rises in share prices 
were concentrated in major expansion cycles (i.e., 1832–1837 and 1842–
1848) isn’t always supported by our new indices.24  
 The large fall in the two existing indices at the beginning of the 
sample period is mainly due to the collapse in mining shares. Our 
indices also fall at this time, but because of our larger sample, the fall in 
mining shares has less of an impact on our unweighted index. Indeed, 
Gayer et al. recognize that a large part of the volatility in their index in 
the pre-1836 period is due to mining shares. As can be seen from Table 
2, mining shares constitute only a small part of our indices at this time, 
whereas mining stocks constitute approximately 10 percent of the Gayer 
et al. index.  
 Like the two existing indices, our indices show a rise in the  
stock market in 1830, followed by a fall in 1830/31. However, unlike 
the existing indices, our indices do not show a substantial rise during 
the 1836 railway mania, followed by a dramatic fall during the 
commercial crisis of 1837. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, 
railways only constitute 17 percent of our weighted indices and less 
than 14 percent of our unweighted indices at this time, whereas they 
constitute 44 percent of Gayer et al.’s.25 Secondly, the declining canal 
sector acts as a drag on our indices at this time because they constitute 
about 27 percent of our indices, whereas they constitute only 16 percent 
of Gayer et al.’s. 
 In the period 1837–1841 the increases in our indices suggest rising 
stock prices, whereas the existing indices suggest falling stock prices. 
This difference arises for two reasons. Firstly, our indices include the 
established and newly formed railways, whereas Gayer et al.’s only 
contains existing railways whose stock fell in this period partly due  
to the entrance of the new railways.26 Secondly, as can be seen from 
Table 2, railways becoming an increasingly important component of our 
indices at this time. 
 The major cycle in the existing indices occurs in the period 1841–
1849, a period which is dominated by the railway mania which burst  
in late 1845. Notably, our indices also display this pattern and move  
in tandem with the existing indices in this period. Unlike the earlier  
 
 
24 Gayer, Rostow, and Jacobson Schwartz, Growth and Fluctuation, vol. I, p. 405. 
25 Ibid., p. 364. 
26 Gayer et al.’s index of railway stock falls from 101.2 in Jan. 1837 to a low of 75.4 in Mar. 
1840. See ibid., p. 375. 
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FIGURE 4 
MONTHLY DIVIDEND YIELDS FOR ALL INDUSTRIES, 1825–1870 
 
Sources: See the text. 
 
periods, our indices in this period are similar to the existing indices  
in that the dominant railway sector is roughly given the same weighting. 
In addition, the railway stock in the existing indices appreciates and 
depreciates in line with the rest of the railway sector. 
 Hayek’s index is relatively stagnant in the 1850s, whereas the  
new indices suggest rising stock prices. This difference may simply  
be down to constituents as our indices include banks and insurance 
companies, which perform well in this period, whereas Hayek’s index 
doesn’t include these sectors. Interestingly, however, our indices 
correlate closely with Hayek’s from about 1860 onwards, suggesting 
that what Hayek terms industrial shares moved in tandem with the 
overall equity market. 
 
DIVIDEND YIELDS AND TOTAL RETURNS 
 
 Figure 4, which contains monthly dividend yields for the entire 
sample, reveals that the dividend yield for the weighted and unweighted 
series are similar from the 1830s onwards, with the unweighted series 
being occasionally greater than the weighted series.27 This suggests  
 
27 The large spike in dividend yield which occurs in the late 1840s is due mainly to the fall 
and subsequent recovery of railway prices. 
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that smaller companies paid similar or higher dividends than their  
larger counterparts. Economists have traditionally suggested that large 
(and presumably mature) companies should pay higher dividends as 
they have fewer investment opportunities.28 On the other hand, small 
companies may be forced to pay higher dividends because of their 
higher costs of retaining earnings due to agency problems between 
shareholders and corporate insiders.29 An alternative, although less 
likely, explanation is that the illiquidity of small stocks may have made 
it prohibitively costly for investors to realize some of their capital gains 
by selling a proportion of their stock, and, as a result, such firms had to 
pay higher dividends. Another possible explanation is that companies in 
early capital markets paid high dividends because reliable information 
about the true value of stocks was scarce; the lack of information would 
have been particularly severe for small companies that were trying to 
attract new investors.30  
 Dividend yields trend slightly upwards over the sample period, 
although this is less so for the weighted series which contain all 
companies. However, yields do begin to trend downwards in the late 
1860s, and, according to Grossman, this decline continues into the next 
decade.31  
 Table 3 contains annual returns as well as the value of the total 
returns index in December of each year. The extremely high terminal 
value of the unweighted index reflects the cumulative impact of  
the higher dividend yields earned by smaller companies. The index 
weighted by paid-up capital is always below that weighted by market 
capitalization, thanks to the latter series’ higher capital appreciation.  
As Table 3 shows, the gap between the weighted and unweighted 
indices widened after 1850, as a result of both higher dividend yields 
and capital appreciation. After 1850 smaller stocks both paid higher 
dividends and enjoyed greater capital gains, suggesting that if there was 
a small-firm effect, it became more apparent from this time onwards. 
Perhaps the failure of many small railway companies following the 
railway mania led investors to demand a small-firm premium in this 
nascent market.  
 
 
 
28 Smith and Watts, “Investment Opportunity Set”; Gaver and Gaver, “Additional Evidence”; 
and Fama and French, “Disappearing Dividends.” 
29 Easterbrook, “Two Agency Cost Explanations”; and Jensen, “Agency Costs.” 
30 Baskin and Miranti, History of Corporate Finance, p. 19. 
31 Grossman, “New Indices,” p. 135. 
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TABLE 3 
ANNUAL STOCK MARKET RETURNS, 1825–1870 
(percent) 
 
Weighted by Market 
Capitalization 
Weighted by Paid-Up  
Capital Unweighted 
 
Cap. 
Apprec.
(1) 
Div. 
Yield 
(2) 
Total 
Return 
(3) 
Index 
Value 
(4) 
Cap. 
Apprec.
(1) 
Div. 
Yield
(2) 
Total 
Return
(3) 
Index 
Value 
(4) 
Cap. 
Apprec.
(1) 
Div. 
Yield
(2) 
Total 
Return 
(3) 
Index 
Value 
(4) 
1825 –7.18 2.29 –4.89 95.11 –12.86 1.95 –10.90 89.10 –19.17 1.24 –17.94 82.06 
1826 –7.33 4.05 –3.28 91.99 –11.94 3.54 –8.40 81.62 –9.52 2.85 –6.67 76.59 
1827 2.25 4.34 6.59 98.05 0.94 3.91 4.85 85.58 0.05 3.40 3.44 79.22 
1828 0.10 4.16 4.26 102.23 –3.74 3.53 –0.22 85.39 –1.81 3.32 1.51 80.42 
1829 1.92 4.33 6.24 108.61 0.92 3.77 4.69 89.40 1.00 3.60 4.60 84.12 
1830 –5.61 3.83 –1.78 106.68 –4.03 3.30 –0.73 88.74 1.75 3.54 5.29 88.57 
1831 –4.95 4.48 –0.47 106.17 –6.04 3.80 –2.25 86.75 –4.86 3.76 –1.10 87.59 
1832 6.49 5.11 11.60 118.49 8.07 4.52 12.59 97.67 5.44 4.30 9.74 96.13 
1833 7.34 4.70 12.03 132.75 8.31 4.26 12.57 109.94 10.82 4.29 15.11 110.65 
1834 2.90 4.30 7.20 142.30 0.56 3.75 4.30 114.68 2.36 3.77 6.13 117.43 
1835 7.30 4.39 11.69 158.93 4.07 3.81 7.88 123.71 2.91 3.69 6.60 125.18 
1836 11.13 4.05 15.18 183.06 6.03 3.67 9.70 135.71 4.44 3.51 7.95 135.14 
1837 5.59 3.98 9.58 200.59 3.65 3.66 7.31 145.63 9.62 3.93 13.55 153.44 
1838 12.24 3.89 16.13 232.94 10.55 3.68 14.23 166.35 10.91 4.18 15.09 176.60 
1839 –1.29 3.79 2.50 238.75 –3.23 3.42 0.19 166.66 2.94 3.85 6.79 188.59 
1840 8.73 3.96 12.69 269.05 4.82 3.48 8.30 180.50 1.52 3.81 5.33 198.64 
1841 –2.16 3.90 1.74 273.72 –3.49 3.49 0.00 180.49 0.24 4.00 4.24 207.06 
1842 5.25 5.09 10.34 302.01 2.03 4.48 6.51 192.24 1.73 4.61 6.34 220.18 
1843 16.08 5.34 21.43 366.73 15.75 5.04 20.79 232.20 7.83 4.95 12.78 248.33 
1844 13.57 4.51 18.07 433.01 15.31 4.45 19.76 278.09 11.76 4.76 16.52 289.35 
1845 19.94 4.19 24.13 537.48 13.22 4.05 17.28 326.13 23.78 5.11 28.89 372.94 
1846 2.58 3.75 6.33 571.48 –1.43 3.66 2.23 333.40 3.28 3.97 7.24 399.95 
1847 –15.70 3.87 –11.83 503.85 –20.37 4.21 –16.17 279.50 –13.35 4.56 –8.79 364.79 
1848 –2.61 6.01 3.41 521.01 –4.28 7.79 3.51 289.31 3.81 9.63 13.44 413.81 
1849 –1.65 6.54 4.89 546.48 –8.32 8.50 0.18 289.84 9.37 10.53 19.89 496.13 
1851 7.28 4.65 11.93 774.65 7.06 4.90 11.96 434.03 9.09 5.37 14.46 722.81 
1852 29.14 5.12 34.26 1040.06 32.84 5.07 37.92 598.60 38.82 5.71 44.53 1044.66 
1853 –7.46 3.54 –3.92 999.30 –11.66 3.29 –8.37 548.51 –5.27 3.47 –1.81 1025.78 
1854 0.83 4.68 5.52 1054.43 –2.43 4.31 1.88 558.82 –0.70 4.08 3.38 1060.48 
1855 4.17 5.04 9.21 1151.53 1.94 4.48 6.42 594.67 3.68 4.48 8.16 1147.05 
1856 14.01 5.42 19.44 1375.35 17.20 5.22 22.42 728.01 9.02 4.83 13.85 1305.96 
1857 –3.32 4.87 1.55 1396.63 –4.63 4.67 0.04 728.33 –3.78 4.63 0.85 1317.03 
1858 12.31 5.19 17.50 1641.05 10.09 5.07 15.16 838.74 9.87 5.41 15.28 1518.22 
1859 5.53 4.88 10.41 1811.93 4.55 4.88 9.43 917.84 10.22 5.47 15.69 1756.47 
1860 6.65 5.19 11.84 2026.42 6.72 5.38 12.10 1028.86 4.79 5.03 9.82 1928.93
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TABLE 3 — continued 
 
Weighted by Market 
Capitalization 
Weighted by Paid-Up  
Capital Unweighted 
 
Cap. 
Apprec.
(1) 
Div. 
Yield 
(2) 
Total 
Return 
(3) 
Index 
Value 
(4) 
Cap. 
Apprec.
(1) 
Div. 
Yield
(2) 
Total 
Return
(3) 
Index 
Value 
(4) 
Cap. 
Apprec.
(1) 
Div. 
Yield
(2) 
Total 
Return 
(3) 
Index 
Value 
(4) 
1861 –2.32 4.80 2.48 2076.61 –2.26 5.19 2.93 1058.99 6.30 5.47 11.78 2156.12 
1862 9.31 4.91 14.23 2372.05 7.49 5.13 12.62 1192.59 12.80 5.47 18.27 2549.99 
1863 9.39 4.99 14.38 2713.14 7.39 4.94 12.33 1339.67 9.70 4.68 14.37 2916.53 
1864 9.29 5.42 14.71 3112.14 6.47 5.37 11.84 1498.30 9.25 5.14 14.39 3336.30 
1865 3.22 5.71 8.93 3389.95 –0.50 5.44 4.93 1572.22 4.07 6.09 10.16 3675.17 
1866 –3.43 5.95 2.52 3475.24 –7.70 6.38 –1.33 1551.36 –4.20 7.18 2.98 3784.70 
1867 –3.22 6.06 2.84 3574.00 –5.79 7.16 1.38 1572.72 3.32 8.93 12.25 4248.28 
1868 5.63 5.71 11.34 3979.34 6.15 5.70 11.85 1759.11 12.44 7.11 19.55 5078.88 
1869 8.02 5.70 13.73 4525.54 6.03 5.43 11.46 1960.71 9.75 6.81 16.56 5919.70 
1870 8.06 5.60 13.67 5144.15 5.99 5.35 11.33 2182.90 12.97 6.59 19.56 7077.60
(1) Capital Appreciation; (2) Dividend Yield; (3) Total Return; (4) Index Value at Dec. 
Notes: Index is total market returns, MRtI . 
Source: See the text. 
 
 Table 4 contains summary statistics for annualized returns data for 
the British market in the period 1825–1870. The two panels in the table 
reveal whether our findings are being driven by railways, the dominant 
sector in our sample. Several features of these summary statistics in 
Table 4 are worthy of note. First, shareholders in this era received  
the majority of their returns through dividends rather than capital gains. 
Second, the higher returns on the unweighted portfolios of all 
companies suggest that there is a small-firm premium, although more 
rigorous analysis is required to prove its existence. Third, railways,  
the dominant sector in our sample, paid lower dividends than other 
industries, although the return railroad investors received through 
capital appreciation was slightly higher. Fourth, the highest total stock 
market returns in our sample period were achieved in 1852 for both the 
weighted and unweighted returns, whereas 1825 and 1847 were the 
worst years. As can be seen from Table 4, the negative returns in 1847 
are mainly as a result of the crash of the railway mania. Fifth, although 
the number of years producing negative capital gains ranges from nine 
to 18 depending on weighting method, high dividend yields meant that 
the total stock market return was negative for only six years using the 
market capitalization weighted returns (1825, 26, 30, 31, 47, and 53). 
Finally, the relatively high autocorrelation of the capital appreciation 
series suggests that many stocks were illiquid.  
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TABLE 4 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ANNUAL STOCK MARKET RETURNS, 1825–1870 
(percent) 
 
Arithmetic
Mean 
Geometric 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Max. 
Return 
Min. 
Return 
Percent 
 0 Autocorrelation 
Panel A: Including Railways       
Capital appreciation        
Weighted by paid-up 
capital 2.67 2.23 9.72 32.84g –20.37c 60.87
 
24.92 
Weighted by market  
capitalization 4.51 4.19 8.38 29.14g –15.70c 69.57
 
23.17 
Unweighted 5.14 4.75 9.24 38.82g –19.17a 80.43 21.25 
Dividend yield        
Weighted by paid-up 
capital 4.72 4.71 1.46 10.15f 1.95a 100.00
 
97.33 
Weighted by market  
capitalization 4.77 4.77 0.89 7.17f 2.29a 100.00
 
96.89 
Unweighted 5.02 5.00 1.86 10.53e 1.24a 100.00 97.85 
Total return        
Weighted by paid-up 
capital 7.40 6.93 10.19 37.92g –16.17c 80.43
 
24.77 
Weighted by market 
capitalization 9.28 8.94 8.70 34.26g –11.83c 86.96
 
23.01 
Unweighted 10.16 9.70 10.16 44.53g –17.94a 89.13 22.44 
        
        
Panel B: Excluding Railways       
Capital appreciation        
Weighted by paid-up 
capital 2.23 1.96 7.57 28.93g –12.86a 65.22
 
21.98 
Weighted by market  
capitalization 3.91 3.70 6.89 28.95g –8.18c 76.09
27.40 
Unweighted 3.52 3.23 7.93 30.64g –19.25a 73.91 19.54 
Dividend yield        
Weighted by paid-up 
capital 5.29 5.28 1.68 10.33e 1.96a 100.00
 
95.54 
Weighted by market 
capitalization 5.16 5.16 0.98 7.44h 2.29a 100.00
 
97.46 
Unweighted 5.01 5.00 1.41 8.34h 1.24a 100.00 97.50 
Total return        
Weighted by paid-up 
capital 7.52 7.22 8.30 35.03g –10.90a 84.78
 
22.56 
Weighted by market 
capitalization 9.07 8.84 7.40 34.57g –4.88a 89.13
 
27.91 
Unweighted 8.54 8.19 8.79 36.98g –18.01a 91.30 21.20 
        
Yield on 3% consols 3.32 3.32 0.20 3.82b 2.60a 100.00 94.92 
Inflation 0.03 0.00 6.71 17.40d –12.10a 47.83 22.93 
a = 1825; b = 1826; c = 1847; d = 1848; e = 1849; f =1850; g = 1852; h = 1867.   
Note: Autocorrelation figures for the stock indices are based on monthly return data.  
Source: Inflation data is from O’Donoghue, Goulding, and Allen, “Composite Price Index.” 
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In order to obtain an estimate of the realized equity risk premium,  
we use the yield on 3 percent consols as a proxy for the risk-free rate; 
monthly consol prices were obtained from the Course of the Exchange. 
consols were widely traded instruments and the efficiency of the market 
in consols makes them a reliable comparator.32 The summary statistics 
for the yield are reported in Table 4. Comparing our stock market return 
to this yield suggests that there was a very high equity risk premium in 
this period. The only other domestic bond finance which investors could 
hold as alternatives to common equity was railway debentures, but these 
securities weren’t common until the 1860s, and even then they only 
typically paid 4 percent.33 However, preferred or preference shares were 
increasingly popular with investors from the late 1840s onwards, and 
they were widely regarded as a debt-like instrument by investors.34 
Preference shares were mainly issued by railway companies and paid a 
fixed income ranging from 4 to 6 percent depending on the individual 
company, which is substantially less than the returns on common equity 
reported in Table 4.   
 Table 4 also shows that average stock returns were much higher  
than average inflation in this time period. However, our sample period 
can be neatly subdivided into two subperiods with pre-1850 being a 
period of deflation and post-1850 being an inflationary period. The 
arithmetic average nominal and real returns on the portfolio weighted 
by market capitalization for the pre-1850 period are 8.09 percent and 
9.44 percent respectively. The corresponding figures for the post-1850 
period are 10.83 percent (nominal) and 10.49 percent (real). Thus, the 
average returns on the market in the post-1850 period are greater in both 
nominal and real terms, suggesting that not only did equities outperform 
general inflation, but that equities performed better in the inflationary 
environment.   
 Table 5 presents a series of total returns for the British market for the 
period 1826–1913. To construct this series, and to ensure compatibility 
between our series and Grossman’s annual series which runs from 1871 
to 1913, we used Grossman’s method of calculating annual returns. In 
other words, the annual capital gain for each stock is obtained by 
comparing December stock prices, and the annual dividend yield is 
calculated as the annual dividend divided by the previous December’s  
 
 
32 Brown and Easton, “Weak-Form Efficiency.” 
33 In 1865 it is reckoned that only 3.24 percent of total railway capital was debenture stock. 
See Jefferys, Business Organisation, p. 245. 
34 Ibid., p. 220. See Baskin and Miranti, History of Corporate Finance, p. 152, for more 
information on preference stock. 
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TABLE 5 
ANNUAL TOTAL RETURNS, 1826–1913 
(percent) 
    WMC    WPC   UN     WMC   WPC    UN 
1826 –5.29 –7.07 –8.97  1870 9.23 7.32 10.69 
1827 7.32 6.00 3.65  1871 26.19 25.81 21.99 
1828 3.86 1.67 2.42  1872 6.31 5.83 8.49 
1829 4.34 2.98 3.56  1873 4.97 4.22 6.05 
1830 –2.19 –0.41 4.49  1874 3.17 –1.73 4.25 
1831 –1.59 –4.27 –2.15  1875 7.53 8.13 8.58 
1832 10.91 10.56 8.14  1876 6.84 3.44 5.67 
1833 11.32 10.86 11.16  1877 8.87 6.86 6.03 
1834 6.64 4.72 4.65  1878 0.52 0.17 –2.99 
1835 5.87 4.64 5.52  1879 15.65 29.92 23.89 
1836 6.98 6.20 4.43  1880 13.81 15.10 11.15 
1837 6.81 4.13 5.33  1881 16.68 5.19 4.30 
1838 10.87 9.69 7.76  1882 1.56 0.31 0.71 
1839 2.91 0.40 4.95  1883 0.31 –2.81 –3.46 
1840 6.48 3.99 2.65  1884 3.40 0.93 4.93 
1841 –0.40 –1.74 –0.22  1885 2.96 –0.75 4.36 
1842 9.66 6.44 5.28  1886 2.65 –1.49 8.60 
1843 18.43 18.08 10.44  1887 3.17 –3.16 4.58 
1844 12.34 14.64 13.75  1888 13.61 16.51 13.07 
1845 10.32 9.96 7.92  1889 9.22 8.11 14.82 
1846 2.46 –0.24 –1.00  1890 4.22 2.45 –0.63 
1847 –2.10 –2.68 –1.16  1891 –0.41 –2.66 –1.32 
1848 0.92 3.61 2.22  1892 0.43 –1.65 –0.35 
1849 7.83 5.57 14.90  1893 –0.09 –1.87 2.55 
1850 9.96 10.80 11.98  1894 10.75 8.62 12.18 
1851 8.97 9.76 10.84  1895 12.32 7.99 20.88 
1852 23.66 24.77 29.78  1896 12.21 10.17 20.02 
1853 0.20 –3.97 –3.08  1897 6.83 4.37 7.80 
1854 3.87 1.11 –0.83  1898 5.24 –0.71 5.77 
1855 4.85 2.19 4.68  1899 4.67 4.15 12.19 
1856 18.37 21.11 10.73  1900 9.46 7.23 5.56 
1857 1.42 0.43 0.80  1901 4.91 –3.97 2.57 
1858 13.18 11.39 8.76  1902 5.89 0.38 4.28 
1859 7.87 7.17 8.97  1903 1.67 1.35 3.57 
1860 10.55 10.64 6.97  1904 11.12 10.82 8.76 
1861 3.02 3.43 6.06  1905 10.94 18.83 10.33 
1862 13.03 11.73 16.00  1906 9.63 17.02 6.17 
1863 11.16 10.22 9.66  1907 –0.16 –3.65 –2.20 
1864 8.85 8.17 8.39  1908 8.68 –4.62 8.26 
1865 4.17 2.97 2.82  1909 11.49 12.44 10.73 
1866 0.63 –2.23 –3.63  1910 4.95 1.93 7.19 
1867 3.08 2.58 7.61  1911 3.21 0.13 6.86 
1868 8.81 8.36 10.66  1912 5.86 5.78 10.19 
1869 14.83 11.18 14.23  1913 0.65 –1.54 –0.10 
Notes: WPC = weighted by paid-up capital; WMC = weighted by market capitalization; UN = 
unweighted. 
Source: Returns on British market 1871–1913 are from Grossman, “New Indices.”  
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stock price. The annual total return was calculated by summing these 
two components.35 As discussed above, our series of returns is a 
substantial subsample of the companies in Grossman’s series, making it 
feasible to splice these two series.  
 
SURVIVORSHIP BIAS AND RETURNS 
 
 As is the case with most stock market indices, our indices are subject 
to survivorship bias. In other words, stock returns are overestimated 
because some companies in our sample may have become bankrupt. 
Typically, one cannot tell from the Course of the Exchange why a 
particular company was delisted.36 Mergers weren’t a common reason 
for delisting in this period, except for railways, and for them Henry G. 
Lewin gives details of the mergers or name changes which occurred in 
the decades after the railway mania.37 From this list, we identified 53 
railways which disappeared from our sample because they merged  
with another company and three railways which disappeared because of 
name changes. None of the shares issued by these companies are 
counted as cases of attrition. 
 We used three strategies to deal with the remaining companies which 
disappeared from our sample. The first treats all delisted firms (save, of 
course, for the merged railroads) as having become bankrupt. The 
second strategy requires that firms had to be in the market for at least 36 
months before they could be considered true victims of attrition; this 
strategy thus avoids attributing to attrition cases of firms which never 
fully established in the market.38 The third attrition strategy takes into 
account that some firms delisted for reasons other than bankruptcy. 
Here we used the Investors’ Monthly Manual, which, beginning in the 
mid-1860s, provides a comprehensive coverage of equity traded on all 
British markets, not just the London market. We checked the December 
1870 edition to see if any of the companies which had at some point 
disappeared from our sample were still in existence at the end of our 
sample period. There were 77 firms which had disappeared from our 
data set but nonetheless appeared in the December 1870 edition of  
the Investors’ Monthly Manual; many of these equities had simply 
moved their listing to a regional stock exchange. Consequently, these  
 
35 Calculating returns in this way slightly reduces the average annual return for the 1825–
1870 period as returns are not compounded monthly. 
36 From the Course of the Exchange, we were able to identify four dock and two insurance 
companies which disappeared because of mergers, and one insurance company which changed 
its name. 
37 Lewin, Railway Mania, pp. 474–79. 
38 Grossman, “New Indices,” pp. 140–41. 
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77 companies are not counted as victims attrition. Note that this third 
attrition strategy also requires that firms had to be listed for at least 36 
months before their subsequence disappearance could be counted as a 
case of attrition.  
 Within each attrition strategy, there were two ways we adjusted for 
survivorship bias. The lower bound adjustment viewed shareholders  
as suffering a –100 percent return at delisting, and the capital 
appreciation and dividend yield of the shares were assumed to zero for 
the rest of our sample period. Information from a stock’s last trading 
month (number of issued shares, price, and paid-up capital) was used to 
calculate the relevant weighting factor. This could be viewed as a buy-
and-hold survivorship bias adjustment. The upper bound adjustment 
was one which viewed shareholders as suffering a –100 percent return 
and a zero dividend payment at delisting, with the stock disappearing 
from their portfolio at this date, which implies that, unlike in the case of 
our lower bound adjustment, the subsequent zero dividend yields and 
capital appreciation of delisted stocks do not enter our calculations of 
average market returns.  
 Table 6 reports the attrition-adjusted returns using our three methods. 
As one can clearly see, the first attrition strategy has the largest effect on 
our return estimates and the third strategy has the least severe impact. We 
also observe that attrition reduces the returns of the unweighted portfolios 
more than those of the weighted portfolios. This suggests that many of 
our delisting companies are small firms, which is not surprising given 
their higher probability of bankruptcy. Notably, the lower bound attrition 
method has a greater impact, relatively speaking, on capital appreciation.  
 After accounting for attrition using the lower bound method, one  
can see from Table 6 that dividends now constitute a greater proportion 
of total return. Indeed, apart from the market capitalization weighted 
returns, annual capital appreciation is very close to zero. This suggests 
that shareholders enjoyed capital appreciation mainly on stocks of  
large firms. Interestingly, after taking account of attrition using the 
upper bound adjustment, the unweighted dividend yields are still larger  
than the weighted returns, suggesting that smaller stocks have higher 
dividend yields. 
 Figure 5 plots indices of total returns weighted by market 
capitalization. One can see that over the sample period, attrition has a 
substantial impact on the total return indices. Nevertheless, even using 
the estimate from the most severe attrition methodology, investors still 
enjoy a substantial return over this time period as the total return index 
grows 741 percent by 1870, with the annual rate of return being 4.62 
percent.  
 Rule Britannia!  1131 
  
 
TABLE 6 
AVERAGE ANNUAL STOCK MARKET RETURNS AFTER ATTRITION ADJUSTMENTS, 
1825–1870 
(percent) 
 Capital 
Appreciation
Dividend  
Yield 
 Total  
Return 
Panel A: Market capitalization weighted    
     
Return without taking account of attrition 4.51 4.77 9.28 
    
Attrition strategy 1    
Upper bound 1.48 4.63 6.11 
Lower bound 1.15 3.47 4.62 
Attrition strategy 2    
Upper bound 2.31 4.67 6.98 
Lower bound 1.98 3.80 5.78 
Attrition strategy 3    
Upper bound 2.66 4.68 7.34 
Lower bound 2.23 3.89 6.12 
    
Panel B: Paid-up capital weighted   
    
Return without taking account of attrition 2.67 4.72 7.40 
    
Attrition strategy 1    
Upper bound –0.70 4.55 3.85 
Lower bound –0.73 3.29 2.56 
Attrition strategy 2    
Upper bound 0.16 4.60 4.76 
Lower bound 0.07 3.64 3.71 
Attrition strategy 3    
Upper bound 0.54 4.62 5.16 
Lower bound 0.29 3.72 4.01 
   
Panel C: Unweighted    
    
Return without taking account of attrition 5.14 5.02 10.16 
    
Attrition strategy 1    
Upper bound –1.32 4.69 3.38 
Lower bound –1.27 2.26 0.99 
Attrition strategy 2    
Upper bound 1.18 4.82 6.00 
Lower bound 0.40 3.01 3.40 
Attrition strategy 3    
Upper bound 1.87 4.85 6.72 
Lower bound 0.83 3.15 3.97 
Notes: The three attrition strategies compensate for survivorship bias. For the definition of each, 
see the text.  
Source: See the text. 
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FIGURE 5 
MONTHLY INDICES OF TOTAL RETURN WEIGHTED BY MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION, 1825–1870 
 
Notes: See the text for the definitions of these various attrition measures. 
Sources: See the text. 
 
 One potential weakness with our correction for survivorship bias  
is that it ignores the losses produced by companies (particularly 
fraudulent ones) that briefly entered but were listed for less than 12 
months before disappearing. Investors may have lost significant sums  
to such companies, particularly during the railway mania of the mid-
1840s, when there were a number of “bubble” or fraudulent promotions. 
Omitting these companies, however, is unlikely to bias our results 
significantly, for at least three reasons. First, the companies were 
typically small entities, and therefore would have little impact on our 
weighted series of returns. Second, many of the companies which 
delisted within 12 months did so because there were unable to attract 
sufficient funds from investors. Third, investors who did put money in 
short-lived companies typically only paid in a very small amount of 
capital initially; that was true in particular of railways.39 Further calls 
were only issued if the company was successful in getting off the 
ground. Hence, investors in short-lived companies typically lost very 
little.
 
 
39 See Kostal, Law, chap. 1. 
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THE COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF THE 1825–1870 EQUITY 
MARKET 
 
 Table 7 compares the returns on the British equity market in the 
1825–1870 period with those of the United States in the same period 
and with later epochs in the British market. Although such comparisons 
help place the performance of the 1825–1870 British equity market in 
context, they should be made circumspectly due to possible differences 
in construction, constituents, and survivorship bias. 
 Richard Sylla, in his recent comparison of the British and U.S. 
financial systems, suggests that by 1830 the U.S. financial system  
had more corporations (due to liberal incorporation laws) and a better 
developed securities market.40 However, he also suggests that the  
U.S. financial system went into a reversal over the subsequent four 
decades, allowing the British financial system to catch up with its U.S. 
counterpart. Consequently, a comparison of the performance of these 
two equity markets in this period should prove instructive for his  
thesis. Comparing the unweighted returns for Britain with those for the 
United States, it is noteworthy that the real return estimates for the 
United States are higher than those of Britain, although the difference  
in means between the British unweighted return and the low-dividend 
estimate for the United States is not statistically significant. However, 
as the higher coefficient of variation shows, the U.S. market was riskier 
than the British market. Alternatively, the high capital appreciation  
for the United States could be due to the upward bias induced by  
the large movements of stock prices which sometimes arise as a 
consequence of infrequent trading.41 As price or capitalization weighted 
returns to a large extent eliminate this bias, it may be more illuminating 
to compare the weighted returns for the United States and Britain. If we 
do so, we find that the differences in average annual real returns are not 
statistically significant from zero. That is somewhat surprising given the 
higher levels of risk in the United States market as measured by the 
coefficient of variation. Notably, in both markets, dividend returns are 
the major component of total returns, which is the reverse of what we 
observe in modern equity markets.42 
 As we can see from Panels C and D of Table 7, total real returns  
are lower in both the 1872–1913 and 1946–1999 periods than in the 
period 1825–1870. One possible explanation for this is that the market  
 
 
40 Sylla, “Comparing.” 
41 Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Peng, “New Historical Database.” 
42 Fama and French, “Disappearing Dividends.” 
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TABLE 7 
COMPARISON OF ANNUAL AVERAGE RETURNS WITH UNITED STATES AND  
POST-1870 BRITAIN 
(percent) 
 
Capital 
Appreciation
Dividend 
Yield 
Nominal 
Total Return
Real Total 
Return 
Panel A: Britain, 1825–1870     
Market capitalization weighted 4.51 
(1.86) 
4.77 
(0.19) 
9.28 
(0.94) 
9.90 
(1.28) 
Paid-up capital weighted 2.67 
(3.63) 
4.72 
(0.31) 
7.40 
(1.38) 
8.07 
(1.76) 
Unweighted 5.14
(1.80) 
5.02
(0.37) 
10.16
(1.00) 
10.83 
(1.29) 
     
Panel B: United States, 1825–1870    
Price weighted (high dividend estimate) 2.19 
(7.53) 
9.34 
(0.42) 
11.53 
(1.50) 
10.71 
(1.64) 
Price weighted (low dividend estimate) 2.19 
(7.53) 
3.78 
(0.38) 
5.97 
(2.82) 
5.17 
(3.21) 
Unweighted (high dividend estimate) 13.43 
(2.38) 
9.34 
(0.42) 
22.77 
(1.44) 
22.10 
(1.56) 
Unweighted (low dividend estimate) 13.43 
(2.38) 
3.78 
(0.38) 
17.21 
(1.87) 
16.56 
(2.03) 
    
Panel C: Britain, 1872–1913     
Market capitalization weighted 2.84 
(1.64) 
3.48 
(0.13) 
6.33 
(0.74) 
6.39 
(1.08) 
Paid-up capital weighted 1.79 
(4.13) 
2.68 
(0.14) 
4.47 
(1.64) 
4.53 
(1.79) 
Unweighted 1.31 
(4.69) 
5.46 
(0.11) 
6.77 
(0.90) 
6.83 
(1.05) 
    
Panel D: Britain, 1946–1999     
Unweighted 11.39 
(2.22) 
5.13 
(0.28) 
16.52 
(1.50) 
10.26 
(2.55) 
 
 Tests of Difference 
in Means in 
Nominal Total 
Returns  
(adjusted t-statistics)
Test of Equality of 
Coefficients of 
Variation of Nominal 
Total Returns 
(D'AD statistic) 
Britain, 1872–1913 vs. Britain, 1825–1870   
Market capitalization weighted  –1.73*                 1.99 
Paid-up capital weighted              –1.35 2.90* 
Unweighted  –1.71* 3.26* 
    
United States, 1825–1870 vs. Britain, 1825–1870   
Price weighted (high dividend estimate)                0.75 3.72* 
Price weighted (low dividend estimate)              –1.12         6.68*** 
Unweighted (high dividend estimate)          2.56***                 2.67 
Unweighted (low dividend estimate)                1.50       4.35** 
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TABLE 7 — continued 
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level. 
** denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: Coefficient of variation is in parenthesis.  Market capitalization weighted stock returns is 
used to proxy the price weighted returns for Britain over 1825 to 1870. The t-values are adjusted 
to account for the serial correlation of stock returns.  The adjusted t-statistic takes the form: 
 
 
 
 
1 2
2 2
1 21 2
1 1 2 2
1 1
1 1
x xadjusted t
s s
n n
D D
D D
      
 
 
where Į is the first-order autocorrelation of the sample returns, s is the sample standard 
deviation, and n is sample size.  The D'AD statistic is from Feltz and Miller, “Asymptotic Test,” 
and is a test of the equality of coefficients of variation and is asymptotically chi-squared. 
Source: Returns on British market 1872–1913 and 1946–1999 are from Grossman, “New 
Indices.” Returns on U.S. market are calculated from data reported in Goetzmann, Ibbotson,  
and Peng, “New Historical Database.” Inflation data to calculate real returns was obtained  
from O’Donoghue, Goulding, and Allen, “Composite Price Index,” for Britain and Officer and 
Williamson, “Annual Inflation Rates,” for the United States. 
 
was less risky in the post-1870 period, but a comparison of the 
coefficients of variation suggests that the pre-1870 and post-1870 eras 
were just as risky if not riskier. This appears somewhat paradoxical 
given that uncalled capital was a common feature of many companies 
up until the 1870s.43 Indeed, many banks and insurance companies had 
unlimited liability, which can be viewed as an extreme form of uncalled 
capital callable only in the event that the firm enters bankruptcy. 
However, the existence of uncalled capital may have acted as a 
substantial check on management risk-taking behavior, reducing the 
riskiness of stocks carrying uncalled capital. Uncalled capital was less 
prevalent in the British equity market after the 1870s, and therefore the 
check on managerial risk-taking behavior was removed in some cases.44 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Using data from the Course of the Exchange, we have constructed  
the first ever monthly returns series for the British equity market which 
covers the period 1825–1870. These series contain capital appreciation 
and dividends, and are weighted using different weights. We have 
adjusted these series for potential survivorship bias by using various 
attrition strategies.  
 When the British equity market’s performance in 1825–1870 is 
compared to its performance in later eras in the British market, we find 
that returns were higher in 1825–1870, and the difference appears  
 
43 Jefferys, “Denomination” and Business Organisation. 
44 Jefferys, “Denomination.” 
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not to be explained by risk. The reasons for this higher return will be  
the subject of future research. When compared with the market in the 
United States, the British market only earns higher returns based on one 
measure. However, the market in the United States appears to be riskier 
than its British counterpart.  
 Our findings also suggest that the bulk of stockholder returns in this 
period came from dividends rather than capital gains. Indeed, when we 
adjusted for survivorship bias, we found that practically all the return  
to stockholders came from dividends rather than capital appreciation.  
This, of course, is the reverse of the modern-day stock market, where, 
relatively speaking, dividends have disappeared. Future research should 
attempt to explain the long-term evolution of dividends in Britain. 
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